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Under the Direction of Amy McKay 
 
ABSTRACT 
For the past several decades the South has moved toward one-party Republican control, 
and yet the mega-southern state of Florida has not kept pace with the greater Southern 
Republican realignment for candidates running for statewide office. Instead, Florida has 
exhibited a Southern lag, where rural counties maintain higher Democratic registration 
than voting levels in supporting Democratic candidates for governor and U.S. Senate in the 
same general election year. There has been a gradual regional dealignment occurring in 
rural counties that are closer to the Deep Southern states of Alabama and Georgia. Using a 
range of aggregate Florida county election and registration data, research found the 
percentage of white voters and percentage of registered Democrats that comprise counties 
effect the Democratic deviation. These results have implications for campaign strategy and 
can be used in campaign targeting efforts. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Southern politics, General elections, Florida, Partisan change, Voting 
trends, Republican realignment, Democratic dealignment, Democratic deviation 
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In a span of 50 years, the South has experienced a political transition away from 
being so staunchly Democratic, where voters would rather “vote for a yellow dog” than a 
Republican, to being the Republican base that has redefined Southern, and American, 
politics. Southern states went from supporting President Franklin Roosevelt and his 
populist agenda to splintering off1 on racial issues with President Harry Truman’s 
desegregation of the military, to gradually embracing the more conservative paradigm of 
religion and economic agenda of the Republican Party. The South eventually became the 
stronghold of Republican support and produced some of its most notable players from 
Georgians Newt Gingrich and Ralph Reed in the mid 1990’s to Senator Jim DeMint of South 
Carolina today. 
Throughout this thesis the South is defined as the eleven ex-Confederate, or 
secession, states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. It is a standard definition that 
many respected researchers on elections and partisanship have used (see, Black and Black 
1982, 1987, 1992, 2002; Key 1949, 1958; Miller and Shanks 1996; Sundquist 1973). The 
South is divided into two sub-regions: the Deep South and the Peripheral South. The Deep 
South is comprised of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina which 
possess the largest black populations2, are the most insular, and contain the most 
reactionary white populations (McKee, 2012). The Peripheral South is made up of Florida, 
                                                          
1
 Southern politicians and voters briefly left the Democratic Party to become Dixiecrats or 
the States’ Rights Party. 
2 For more on these classifications see V. O. Key, 1949 and Black and Black, 1987. 
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as well as Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, which comprise 
relatively smaller black populations. The Deep South states of Alabama and Georgia and the 
Peripheral South state of Florida are the focus of this study. And unlike other states in the 
Peripheral South, Florida became the first Southern state with an urban majority and was 
most unique in attracting many military installations and high number of Northern 
transplants for its climate for retirement (Black and Black, 1987) which further define it 
from the other Peripheral states. 
In addition to these categories, the state of Florida will be described in five regional 
terms throughout the paper to address geographic areas and voting trends between areas: 
Panhandle/Northeast, Central, West Coastal, East Coastal, and South Florida. The 
Panhandle/Northeast3 refers to the northernmost counties in the state with large black 
populations, but low representation of other minority voters; in this way the 
Panhandle/Northeast resembles the Deep South demographics more than other regions. 
Duval County (home to Jacksonville) is its largest urban area with 537,462 voters as of 
2006, with 143,909 registered black voters (26.8%). And due to Duval’s proximity to 
Georgia, it is expected to exhibit similar voting trends. Moving southward down into the 
state is the Central region, which includes Orlando as its metropolitan city, a growing (non-
Cuban) Latino population, as well as agricultural areas. The West Coastal region includes 
Tampa, St. Petersburg and Ft. Myers, while the East Coastal includes the NASA4 Space 
Coast. And finally South Florida which includes the metropolitan cites of Ft. Lauderdale, 
West Palm Beach and Miami, high population of blacks, and Latinos and Cubans (see figure 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, the number of registered voters in the Panhandle/Northeast is nearly the 
same as that of the entire state of Alabama. 
4 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
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1.1). Most transplants moved to Central, Coastal and South Florida; while the 
Panhandle/Northeast maintained its roots and received transplants from the neighboring 
Southern states (Black and Black, 2002; Jeffreys, 2005). 
 
Figure 1.1 Florida Regions, by county 
 
In those decades between Dixiecrats and the Contract with America (1994), the 
South began to dealign itself with Democrats, and began switching party identification5 and 
                                                          
5
 Many Southern states do not require registration by party – Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Of the Deep South states, only 








voting for candidates of both parties. Political scientists have devoted a good deal of 
research into identifying and understanding Southern voting trends and patterns in states 
and in the electorate with the aim to determine significant factors that motivate voters, 
both individually or in aggregate, to switch party allegiance (Black and Black 1992; 
Carmines and Stanley 1990; Miller and Shanks 1996; Petrocik 1987; Stanley 1988). Much 
of the research has been conducted on federal offices- comparing presidential results with 
those of specific United States (U.S.) congressional representative outcomes (Bullock, 
Hoffman and Gaddie 2005; Carsey 2004; Highton 2000; Kenney and Tom 1984). There 
have only been a handful of studies that have conducted ticket splitting research on a state 
level (Beck et al., 1992; Craig et al, 1999; Mulligan, 2011). While this type of comparison is 
useful, there has been little research on county aggregate election results on the 
willingness of voters to swing support for both Republicans and Democrats for statewide 
offices in the same years. This lack of attention given to state and county dynamics in 
elections can largely be attributed to the difficulty of obtaining data due to state election 
laws or difficulty obtaining results.  The lack of analysis at the state level, Florida in 
particular and countywide level is the impetus to this research. Offices such as U.S. Senate 
and governors have been infrequently studied together. But this paring should be included 
in the research evaluating the voting deviations (here using Democratic candidates in the 
South) since these offices avoid the complications surrounding gerrymandered districts 
typically found in Congressional races, or ideologically extreme districts, which may skew 
analysis. 
Comparing senatorial and gubernatorial elections should provide insight into voting 
trends at the county level. This is in part due to their similarities: statewide constituency, 
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highly visible candidates, and high levels of campaign spending, as well as their differences, 
the responsibility of the office differs in the branch and level of government each represent.  
Atkeson and Randall (1995) found that state electorates hold their governors accountable 
for state economic conditions to the exclusion of national forces such as presidential 
approval and evaluations of the national economy which were more attributed to senators. 
Where Stein (1990) stated that expectations are consistent with a federalist perspective of 
vote choice in midterm elections whereby voters recognize and react to the differing 
responsibilities and circumstances of different branches and levels of government. A 
majority of research narrowly focuses attention to the president and congressional 
contests. However, in doing so researchers have selected a pair that is quite 
unrepresentative of the situation voters typically faces (Burden, 1998). By evaluating 
countywide aggregate data, this analysis eliminates the effects of gerrymandering between 
precincts and congressional lines commonly used to examine two offices. This analysis also 
compares between federal and state level offices rather than the more common federal and 
federal offices. There is an expectation that voters differentiate between federal policies 
undertaken by senatorial candidates and economic issues from gubernatorial candidates.  
Florida gubernatorial races occur during midterm election years and typically have 
lower turnout than Presidential year elections. This provides an additional layer in 
evaluating county-level support for the Democratic candidates running for statewide 
offices. For one thing, divided control emerges from time to time, usually as a result of 
midterm election reversals for presidential approval (Beck, 1992). Evidence of this trend 
can be seen in the election years examined here. And empirical studies by Alesina and 
Rosenthal (1989), Erikson (1990), and Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) have 
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shown the model of midterm effect performs at least as well and often better than the 
traditional empirical voting models that emphasize incumbency advantage and 
retrospective voting on the state of economy (Burden and Kimball, 1998).  
Here these effects will be evaluated by analyzing the absolute value of the percent of 
votes for the Democratic office minus the percent Democratic registration of the same year 
for each county. The senatorial and gubernatorial candidate vote percentages are evaluated 
for each of the following years: 1994, 1998, and 2006 which were when a federal race and a 
statewide race were occurring at the same time without the presence of presidential 
candidates. 
Florida has the distinction of being a Southern state that operates outside of 
traditional Southern trends at the statewide level. Until 2010, Florida had not voted 
straight Republican when both office of Senate and Governor were on the ballot, unlike 
other states in the South. It is large in both land mass and population which includes a 
dense universe of voters and counties with a comprehensive election and registration data 
available for studying the aggregate effects election results. Florida provides an interesting 
universe to study voting patterns since it is in the South and has both Southern and non-
Southern regions, qualities and populations. As of July 2012, Florida6 had 11,483,461 
registered voters, with as few as 4,538 in Lafayette County to 1,249,428 in Miami-Dade 
County. Small counties like Lafayette are expected to act similarly to traditional southern 
conservative states with a Southern lag effect of moving toward solid Republican support, 
whereas counties like Miami-Dade and Broward are expected to continue to vary support, 
                                                          




due in part to high population and high diversity. Unlike other Southern states, 
generational replacement and partisan conversion are not the key factor in transforming 
Florida politics (Jeffreys, 2005).  By using Florida counties to drill down into election data 
and examine voting trends in geographic regions that border the Deep South, this research 
studies aggregate voting patterns in whole counties rather than the more commonly 
districted, gerrymandered-centered research.  
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The South turned from a solid Democratic to a Republican stronghold. The 
splintering divide that began with Truman took hold, in earnest, at the presidential level in 
1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan, and then continued to move down the ballot over 
the decades to Congressman, governors and finally to state legislatures. Now the majority 
of these states are solidly Republican. Florida, however, has not kept pace with these other 
Southern states in their realignment toward Republican representation. Florida did move 
along with the South in its support for Reagan in 1980 but, unlike most Southern states, it 
continues to elect Democratic candidates for statewide office. Florida maintains 
Democratic representation at the statewide level: with both a Democratic Senator and 
governor until 1994 and then a Democratic Senator with a Republican governor and 
Senator. 
Whereas Florida is one of the nation’s top five most populous states, it still has many 
small rural counties7 (in 2006, 34 counties, or 51%, fell into this criteria) that share traits 
with traditional Southern states (e.g., agricultural, high percentage white population, etc.), 
                                                          
7 Rural counties being defined as having less than 70,000 registered voters.  
8 
 
especially in those adjacent to the Deep South states. According to McKee (2010) the 
political behavior of rural residents has been conspicuously absent thus far in a growing 
literature on the political role of place.  It is anticipated these counties have been moving 
similarly to the South’s support for Republican political leadership, but many of these 
counties have not fully dealigned with Democratic candidates at the statewide level and 
still maintain high Democratic registration, even though it is steadily on the decline (see 
table 1.1). In fact, in as late as 2006, 82% of its rural counties still sustained Democratic 
registration of over 50%. Yet these rural counties are shifting away from Democrats in 
statewide representation, and it is anticipated that they will eventually realign with 
Republicans because they share: geographic proximity, economic and racial similarities, 
and in some case media markets which permeate Deep Southern political rhetoric and 
campaign communications.  
Table 1.1 Net Difference of Democrats and Republican Florida Voters, 1994-2006 
(%) Net Democrat 
Media Market  1994 1998 2006 
Miami 15.3 13.7 15.2 
West Palm Beach 0.7 2.4 6.6 
Ft. Myers -17.6 -16.4 -17.3 
Tampa -0.8 -1.4 -1.5 
Orlando -4.3 -3.5 -1.8 
Jacksonville 24.7 13.1 -0.1 
Gainesville 38.6 33.9 24.3 
Tallahassee 54.1 49.2 38.7 
Panama City 52.8 38.9 9.9 
Pensacola 9.5 -4.8 -19.4 




1.2 Expected Results 
It is expected that rural counties, will demonstrate a Southern lag that illustrates 
Democratic deviation between Democratic registration versus Democratic vote for 
candidates.  Even as Democratic registration declines, this deviation will continue to be 
evident as these counties move toward Republican realignment following the Deep South 
model.  By using Democratic absolute deviation voting trends for both parties for senatorial 
and gubernatorial candidates beginning in 1994 to 2006 will attempt to prove this 
hypothesis. These results should be concentrated in the Panhandle/Northeast region of the 
state which, as previously noted, is adjacent to Deep South states and in other rural, 
predominantly white counties. Urban counties which are further away from the Deep South 
will be less likely to follow traditional Southern voting trends of Democratic dealignment 
due in part to their demographics which do not reflect traditional Southern counties with 
its higher numbers of transplants, Latinos, tourism and a host of other factors. By analyzing 
the highly visible statewide races of senate and governor, there should be discernible 
evidence of Democratic deviation in counties which are rural, with high percentage of 
white voters, Democratic voters and voters in the Pensacola-Mobile, AL, Tallahassee-
Thomasville-GA, Panama City, Jacksonville, and Gainesville media markets with particular 
emphasis on the two which share media markets with Alabama and Georgia.  
Counties with high white voter percentages should effect the deviation, particularly 
those with higher black voter populations (those with 10% or more black registration) 
because this demographic make-up mirrors that seen in the Deep South- which also have a 
history of racial tensions dating back to slavery, the Confederacy, and segregation. The 
media markets group geographic areas which are close to one another and receive the 
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same TV campaign communication which should effect candidate support.  And two of the 
media markets in the Panhandle region have overlapping borders with the Deep South.  So 
the Pensacola-Mobile, AL should demonstrate even greater Democratic deviation due to it 
bordering Alabama on two sides (west and north) and it receives additional Alabama 
campaign ads or communication, and Alabama has realigned to the Republican Party. While 
the Tallahassee-Thomasville, GA media market should display, although less so, similar 
changes, because Georgia was slower to move to complete Republican representation at 
the statewide level and some of the counties in this market have high percentages of black 
voters.  
In short, this study will explain a trend of Democratic deviation between 
registration and support for Democratic candidates in rural, high white counties due to a 
Southern lag effect and dealignment from the Democratic Party. 
2. Southern lag 
There is a vast amount of political science research devoted to the dealignment of 
the Democratic Party and the momentum to support the Republican Party and the surge of 
Republican voting in the South is well documented (Aistrup, 1996; Black and Black 1982, 
1987, 1992, 2002, 2007; Lubin 2004; Osborne 2011; Stanley 1988). Yet as V.O. Key (1949) 
pointed out, it has been top down politics in the South beginning with president and 
trickling down the ballot.  
The history of partisan change over the last 50 years involves the reversal of the 
Democratic Party’s popularity and strength in the South to the transfer of power to the 
Republican Party due to white conservative voters (or traditional Southern voters) 
11 
 
(Carmines and Stanley, 1990). Republicans have attracted huge majorities of white 
conservatives and have neutralized the advantages of Democrats with white moderates 
(Black and Black, 2007). As suggested by Born (2000), white Southerners since as early as 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) began moving toward Republicans for president, but 
maintained their loyalty toward local or “home-grown” Democrats. Today there is little 
party deviation between president and congress in the South (outside of metropolitan 
areas) and more are voting in Republican statewide blocs similar to those held by 
Democrats pre-Brown v. Board of Education. Voters convinced that their local Democratic 
nominee was cut from the national liberal mold are more likely to vote Republican (Black 
and Black 1987; Glaser 1996).  
2.1 Dealignment 
The South used Democratic partisan cues for straight Democratic ticket voting for 
decades. Often most elections were decided during the primaries because there were no 
Republican challengers (Black and Black, 1982). But over the past 30 years, Southern states 
and counties began to shift away from straight Democratic tickets to straight Republican 
tickets. The culminating factors in Democratic dealignment in the South began with racial 
tension intensified by Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Political realignments generally 
depend on two factors- one is a change among party elites, and the other is fertile soil in the 
mass public's attitudes (Valentino and Sears, 2005). President Richard Nixon is credited for 
devising the Southern Strategy by exploiting racial tensions to gain Southern support from 
Democrats who felt disenfranchised by President Johnson’s Civil Rights Act. The party 
elites had been working on its strategy for a decade when it finally gained its footing among 
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Southern white voters during Reagan’s bid for the White House, which proved pivotal as 
the Republican turning point in the South. Now things have changed so much that the South 
is once again exceptional, but this time because it is so overwhelmingly Republican (McKee, 
2012). 
Alabama’s realignment to the Republican Party began in 1980 by supporting Reagan 
and electing Jeremiah Denton as its first Republican governor since Reconstruction. And 
since 1980, Alabama has consistently supported Republican presidential candidates. In 
1980, Georgia also voted its first Republican Senator (Mack Mattingly) since 
Reconstruction but it lagged behind Alabama, and the rest of the South, and swung its 
support to native-son President Jimmy Carter. But only four years later, Georgia gave its 
support to Reagan, yet in1992 it cast its electoral votes for Bill Clinton- which would be the 
last time Georgia would support a Democratic presidential candidate.  
The midterm election of 1994 was a terrible year for Democrats, particularly in the 
South. But it would be a changing of the tides for Republicans in the South, a trend which 
would continue and strengthen throughout the decade into the present. In 1994, Southern 
white support for Republican (GOP) candidates surged to record levels enabling the GOP to 
achieve majority status in the region's U.S. Senate and House delegations, and make 
substantial gains in southern state legislatures (Black and Black 2002). In fact, the 
exceptional 16-seat Southern shift to the GOP in 1994 constituted more seats than 
Republicans had gained in the three previous Democratic mid-terms combined (Bullock et 
al., 2005). The Southern realignment toward Republicans had taken hold and after the 
Republicans won control of both houses, Alabama Democratic U.S. Senator Richard Shelby 
switched his party affiliation to Republican, in what would mark a growing trend in the 
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Democratic Party’s Southern defection. By 2002, both Alabama and Georgia would solidly 
vote for Republican candidates at the statewide level. The South’s political landscape is 
shifting in ways that make it worthwhile to ask whether Democrats will, in the foreseeable 
future, be able to compete effectively in Southern statewide elections (Hayes and McKee, 
2008). 






Rest of Florida 
(81%) 
Party 
Registration  1994 1998 2006   1994 1998 2006   1994 1998 2006 
Democrat 49.0 45.0 40.4 61.9 54.1 44.0 45.9 42.8 39.6 
Republican 41.9 40.0 37.7 31.5 34.6 39.7 44.3 41.4 37.3 
Independent 8.6 15.0 21.8 6.0 11.3 16.3 9.3 15.8 23.2 
Net Dem-Rep 7.1 5.0 2.7   30.4 19.6 4.4   1.6 1.4 2.3 
 
Placed in the red state - blue state context in the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections, it is apparent that the polarization of rural and urban voters contributed to 
lopsided election outcomes in these states, whereas the most competitive states exhibited 
no rural-urban divide in vote choice (McKee, 2008). But the tides really began to turn with 
the initial desertion and continued realignment of about one-sixth of the white voters in the 
South who, until 1994, stood by Democratic congressional candidates even as they voted 
for Republican presidential nominees. Prior to 1994, a sizable share of the white electorate 
distinguished between Democratic congressional candidates and presidential candidates; 
since 1994 that distinction has been swept away (Bullock et al., 2005). 
According to Craig et al. (1999), Floridians do not always see their own states 
political leaders as falling within the overarching bonds of traditional partisanship, and on 
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the whole, continue to appraise leaders largely according to their partisan affiliation “(or 
lack of it).” Parties adjust their policies and candidacies to counteract losses in support 
among their electorate, and as a result, former party followers who have left the ranks 
revise their evaluations and return (Fiorina 2002). Thereby creating a party lag in which it 
takes time for the party to react to the changing electorate. It is possible that the issues 
associated with party transformations may help to change the social images of the parties 
for many citizens (Carsey and Layman 2006). Similar to party lag, there is expected to be a 
regional lag in voting trends, particularly in rural and high white voter concentrated 
counties. 
Table 2.2 Florida Voter Registration by Media Market and Party 
(%) Democrat Republican Independent 
Media Market 1994 1998 2006 1994 1998 2006 1994 1998 2006 
Miami 52.6 49.1 45.8 37.3 35.4 30.6 9.6 15.5 23.7 
West Palm Beach 44.6 42.8 41.6 43.9 40.5 35.1 11.0 16.7 23.3 
Ft. Myers 36.9 33.9 29.4 54.5 50.4 46.8 8.3 15.7 23.8 
Tampa 44.7 41.2 37.9 45.5 42.6 39.4 9.3 16.2 22.7 
Orlando 43.6 40.6 37.6 47.8 44.1 39.4 7.9 15.3 22.9 
Jacksonville 59.2 50.6 41.3 34.4 37.4 41.4 6.0 12.0 17.4 
Gainesville 64.7 60.2 52.3 26.1 26.3 28.0 8.3 13.5 19.7 
Tallahassee/GA 73.4 70.4 63.5 19.3 21.3 24.8 6.5 8.3 11.7 
Panama City 74.1 64.8 48.3 21.3 25.8 38.3 3.8 9.4 13.4 
Pensacola/Mobile 51.8 41.6 31.9 42.2 46.5 51.3 5.7 11.9 16.8 
TOTAL 49.0 45.0 40.4   41.9 40.0 37.7   8.6 15.0 21.8 
 
The number of Florida voters with loose partisan ties has contributed to increasing 
competitiveness in the state (Jefferys, 2005). Voters mix and match partisan candidates 
based on their policy shopping list for their desired policy or ideological outcomes. Voters 
use different criteria to gauge their expectations of the office or race at that point in time 
based on one or more factors which could include candidate ideology, issue voting, 
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candidate communication and various other variables. So candidates are measured on 
evaluation variables, with each the voter comparing the Republican and Democratic 
candidates in terms of their “good points” (Lewis-Beck et al, 2008). Unlike the rest of the 
South, the diversity and size of Florida necessitates its candidates to be less extreme at the 
statewide level and more moderate which has insulated it from the Southern Republican 
realignment, particularly in the Deep South. Candidates for senate and governor are 
compelled to position themselves as centrist to appeal to a broad spectrum of persuadable 
voters.  
Many residents in densely populated [Florida] counties share a common political 
rootlessness; they are not blinded by Southern tradition and often have weaker partisan 
ties derived from their home state (Jeffreys, 2005).  Less populated counties may still have 
the remnants of Southern Democrats (pre-Reagan) but also be decreasing in its partisan 
intensity; the Democratic vote deviation should demonstrate this trend. In so far as 
Florida’s total registered voters are concerned, it had 6.6 million in 1994, 8.2 million in 
1998, and 10.2 million in 2006.  In comparison, in 1994 and 1998 Florida had 
approximately the same number of registered voters as the Deep South states of Alabama, 
Georgia and South Carolina combined. And by 2006, it was nearly equal to those three 
states plus half the state of Mississippi8. Even as the Deep South grows, Florida continues to 
surpass them and attract more citizens. And the 20th century transformation of state 
demographics created a Florida population that is a departure from traditional Southern 
populations (Jeffreys, 2005). 
                                                          




2.2 Factors Influencing Realignment 
The white South has not only given up its solid support for the Democrats, but had 
become distinctly more Republican than the rest of the country (Osborne et al., 2011). As 
white Southerners have, in increasing numbers, moved into the Republican Party, African 
Americans have become a solidly Democratic constituency. This has dramatically reshaped 
the distribution of party identification in the South (Hayes and McKee, 2008). Black voters 
make up a high percentage of the minority population in the Deep South, and at higher 
numbers proportionally. It is these same demographic characteristics that are seen in the 
Panhandle/Northeast.  But as a whole, Hispanics are the “majority minority” in Florida. 
The Republican reversal of party control has entailed the realignment of white 
voters. Republicans have attracted huge majorities of white conservatives and have 
neutralized the advantages of Democrats with white moderates (Black and Black, 2007). 
These changes have typically occurred in regions where there are high percentages of black 
voters in the region. Republicans are almost all white, and blacks are the dominant core of 
the southern Democratic Party (Black and Black 2002). By 2006, white voters made up 
84% of the Florida Republican Party, while Hispanic accounted for 11%, and blacks 
comprised 2%. Contrast that with the Democratic Party of Florida in the same year which 
was comprised of 63% white voters, nearly a quarter of whom were black voters (24%) 
and 9% were Latino.  
Florida’s traditional Southern counties (those which are low in diversity, low 
population, rural, etc.) have dealigned with Democrats as seen through registration 
numbers and candidate vote percentage. This can be attributed in part to the fact that the 
Democratic registration in this region has dropped -26 net points from Republican 
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registration from 1994 to 2006, while the rest of the state has not seen a significant change.  
These counties have been gradually losing strength in supporting Democratic candidates 
beyond what their county registration numbers indicate.  
Many of the counties are in this region are rural and lack diversity of non-black 
minority voters which is below 7.5% in as late as 2006. There are counties in the 
Panhandle/Northeast region with high black registration; and overall, the region has 
higher percentage of black voters than does the rest of the state, with 15 to 16% during the 
years being examined. A few counties9 in the Tallahassee metro area that have black 
registration above 30% should show little to no effects from any Southern lag effects, 
although the Tallahassee media market is shared with parts of Georgia (see table 2.3).  
Table 2.3 Florida Voter Registration by Ethnicity and Region 
Statewide Panhandle/Northeast Rest of Florida 
Ethnicity (%) 1994 1998 2006 1994 1998 2006   1994 1998 2006 
White Voters 89.1 80.5 72.0 83.9 81.0 76.6 90.3 80.4 70.9 
Black Voters 9.4 10.6 12.0 14.9 15.6 16.3 8.1 9.4 10.9 
Other Voters 1.5 9.4 16.1 1.2 4.0 7.1 1.6 10.7 18.2 
 
Levernier and Barilla’s (2006) study on determining how region, demographics, and 
economic characteristics affected county-level voting patterns in the 2000 presidential 
election indicated that although economic and demographic characteristics were important 
causes of the voting patterns, the regional location of a county was also important; 
suggesting that unobserved region-specific cultural characteristics were at play. This study 
supports the theory that counties located adjacent to the Deep South should expect to 
                                                          
9 For example, Gadsden County in the Tallahassee area had the highest black percentage of 
any county in the state at 55% in 1998 and 2006. 
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exhibit similar cultural tendencies that would add to the explanation of why counties in 
Panhandle/Northeast region have continued to support mixed statewide representation 
and how it is changing toward Republican domination. Because partisanship is an enduring 
political characteristic usually resistant to sudden alteration (Campbell et al. 1960; Green 
et al. 2002), the long-term pattern of partisanship shows strong evidence of political 
change among rural voters. Rural voters tend to be morally and socially conservative, but 
they might also have good reasons to vote with Democrats on matters of economic 
importance. Nevertheless, data show that their voting loyalty is growing more Republican 
(Gimpel and Karnes, 2006) 
McCarty et al. (2005) put forth that geographic relocation from a community in 
which one’s party identification is in the majority to a community in which one’s 
partisanship is in the minority triggers changes in one’s partisanship and found that 
Democrats who moved to social environments in which their predispositions met greater 
Republican opposition than in the environments in which they grew up were more likely to 
become Republicans. This is especially relevant to Florida which attracts new population 
growth through immigration, retirees, who have greater flexibility in choosing where they 
live, and job seekers, who have less flexibility; this continuous flow of transplants, which 
tend to reside near each other and carry their native voting behaviors with them, can 
influence county voting trends. Americans have become more mobile, they have 
consciously chosen to relocate into communities with politically likeminded neighbors 
(Oppenheimer, 2005). From this it is supposed that as more voters move into areas faster 
than the local county population is growing, the new voters will either influence or usurp 
local voting tendencies. For example, in Orange County (home to Orlando) the inflow of 
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non-Cuban Latinos, who are Democratic leaning supporters, has altered the once 
Republican area to one which swings support to both parties. This kind of self-sorting 
reinforces political similarities within counties and compounds the observable regional 
electoral effects such as moving toward Republican realignment. As counties move their 
support it becomes a predictive indicator of partisan change. If the support from counties 
for the Democratic Party continues to dwindle, eventually expectations shift for these 
counties to completely dealign, if not realign. 
As discussed earlier, these counties share common geographic and demographic 
traits. This paper tests the effects of counties grouped by media markets which political 
campaigns use to target television communication. There is substantial research (Beck et 
al., 1992; Burden and Kimball, 2002; Roscoe, 2003; Gimpel, et al., 2004; Mulligan, 2011) 
supporting that fact that increased campaign media (i.e., print, radio, and TV 
advertisements) is a significant factor for voters to deviate from party allegiance and 
support candidates regardless of party. And although increased TV media will certainly 
increase a candidate’s ability to persuade weak partisans to vote contrary to their party 
affiliations, it may not be observable why – if it is from incumbency, name recognition, 
issue alignment, ad repetition or some other reason. This is due to the limitation on 
gathering information to adequately study the effects given the difficulties obtaining the 
amounts of media used and paid for by candidates and third-party supporters. Past 
research has uncovered several aspects of the influence of media on voting. Roscoe (2003) 
cites evidence that voters are more willing to swing support when individuals are more 
reliant on a vast variety of media and messages. Suggesting that the more candidates utilize 
media, the more it will attract voters to abandon party ties and pick up support.  And so, 
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candidates who outspend their opponents are more visible to voters and better able to 
attract voters from the other party and creating more deviation (Mulligan, 2001). It is 
expected that counties in a defined media market will operate similarly, although not the 
same, in part because they receive the same targeted messages (or lack thereof, if 
candidates choose not to communicate there through TV). This paper focuses on the effects 
campaign communications counties are likely to receive as a group and posits that those 
counties within the Panhandle/Northeast region which share media markets with the Deep 
South will be more inclined to exhibit Southern lag demonstrated through the Democratic 
deviation variable. 
Table 2.4 Florida Voter Registration by Media Market and Ethnicity 
(%) White Voters Black Voters All Other Voters 
Media Market  1994 1998 2006   1994 1998 2006   1994 1998 2006 
Miami 83.6 58.0 43.2 14.4 16.2 18.9 2.0 26.1 37.8 
West Palm Beach 93.3 88.7 80.7 6.5 7.9 9.6 0.2 4.0 9.7 
Ft. Myers 95.8 92.2 87.3 3.0 3.6 3.8 1.3 5.0 8.9 
Tampa 93.1 89.1 81.9 5.8 6.7 7.9 1.1 4.3 10.1 
Orlando 90.5 85.2 74.2 6.6 8.0 9.6 2.9 7.8 16.2 
Jacksonville 81.8 79.2 73.8 17.1 17.4 18.6 1.1 4.2 7.6 
Gainesville 87.7 82.9 75.8 10.8 12.0 13.0 1.5 5.4 11.2 
Tallahassee 75.5 72.2 68.5 23.1 24.9 25.4 1.4 3.5 6.2 
Panama City 90.1 88.1 86.6 9.6 9.8 9.2 0.4 2.6 4.2 
Pensacola 89.3 86.0 82.8 9.3 10.7 10.9 1.4 4.0 6.3 
TOTAL 89.1 80.5 72.0   9.4 10.6 12.0   1.5 9.4 16.1 
 
There are ten media markets in the state of Florida. Each surrounds a general 
population for candidates to target and each varying in cost to advertise (being most 
expensive in the Tampa and Miami media markets and least expensive in Gainesville). The 
media markets are described below with the counties in each, voter population, percent 
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white voters, and political party registration lead. The Florida media markets are (moving 
from the southern part of the state northward):  
• Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (“Miami”) encompasses 3 counties – Broward, Miami-Dade 
and Monroe. In 2006, it had 2,060,875 registered voters, and white voters held a +5 
point plurality over Hispanic voters (43% to 38%), while black voters accounted for 
19% of the market. In 1994 and 2006, Democrats held a +15 point advantage over 
Republicans. 
• West Palm Beach-Ft. Pierce (“West Palm Beach”) contains 5 counties- Indian River, 
Martin, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, and St. Lucie. In 2006, it had 1,115,474 registered 
voters, and white voters accounted for 81% of the market. In 1994, Democrats only 
held a +1 point advantage, while in 2006, Democrats held a +7 point advantage over 
Republicans. 
• Ft. Myers-Naples (“Ft. Myers”) includes 5 counties – Charlotte, Collier, DeSoto, 
Glades, Hendry, and Lee. In 2006, it had 667,927 registered voters, and white voters 
represented 87% of the market. In 1994 and 2006, Republicans held a +18 point 
advantage over Democrats. 
• Tampa-St. Petersburg (“Tampa”) encompasses 10 counties – Citrus, Hardee, 
Hernando, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, and Sarasota. In 
2006, it had 2,547,674 registered voters, and white voters represented 82% of the 
market. In 1994 and 2006, Republicans held a +1 point advantage over Democrats. 
• Orlando-Daytona Beach-Melbourne (“Orlando”) includes counties- Brevard, Flagler, 
Lake, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, Sumter, and Volusia. In 2006, it had 
2,026,101 registered voters, and white voters represented 74% of the market, while 
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Latinos represented 16%. In 1994, Republicans held a +4 point advantage, while in 
2006, Republicans held a +1 point advantage over Democrats. 
The next five media markets are all located within the Panhandle/Northeast region of the 
state. 
• Jacksonville contains 9 counties- Baker, Bradford, Clay, Columbia, Duval, Nassau, 
Putnam, St. Johns, and Union. In 2006, it had 931,879 registered voters, and white 
voters accounted for 74% of the market while black voters represented 19%. In 
1994 Democrats held a +25 point advantage, but by 2006, there was no net 
advantage between Democrats and Republicans. 
• Gainesville includes 4 counties- Alachua, Dixie, Gilchrist, and Levy. In 2006, it had 
191,710 registered voters, and white voters accounted for 76% of the market while 
black voters represented 13%. In 1994 it was a +39 point advantage for Democrats, 
and then in 2006, Democrats held a +24 point advantage over Republicans. 
• Tallahassee, FL-Thomasville, GA (“Tallahassee”) encompasses 10 counties- Gadsden, 
Hamilton, Jefferson, Lafayette, Leon, Madison, Suwannee, Taylor, and Wakulla. In 
2006, it had 258,002 registered voters, and white voters accounted for 68% of the 
market while black voters represented 25%. In 1994, Democrats had a +54 point 
advantage over Republicans, while in 2006, Democrats held a +39 point advantage 
over Republicans. 
• Panama City holds 9 counties- Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson, Liberty, 
Walton, and Washington. In 2006, it had 223,918 registered voters, and white voters 
accounted for 87% of the media market. In 1994 it had a +53 point advantage, but 
by 2006, Democrats held a +10 point advantage over Republicans. 
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• Mobile, AL-Pensacola-Ft. Walton (“Pensacola”) includes 3 counties – Escambia, 
Okaloosa, and Santa Rosa. In 2006, it had 410,289 registered voters, and white 
voters represented 83% of the market, while black voters represented 11%. In 
1994, Democrats held a +10 point advantage, but in 2006, Republicans held a +19 
point advantage over Democrats. 
 














In as late as 2006, three media markets (Tampa, Miami, and Orlando) accounted for 
nearly two-thirds (64%) of the state’s 10.4 million registered voters. These metropolitan 
markets contain voters who are the antithesis of typical Southern regions (high percentage 
of Hispanic and African American voters combined, more affluent voters, etc.). While the 
five media markets in the Panhandle/Northeast only accounted for 19% of the state’s total 
registered voters. However, it is expected the counties in these low population media 
markets that adhere closer to the Southern political paradigm will deviate at a greater rate 
from their Democratic registration than other areas of the state.   
2.3 Florida Election Results 
It is important to understand the candidates who ran for the office in the races being 
analyzed, at least on a cursory level.  1994 was a year for change. Hugh Rodham, a Miami-
Dade County public defender and brother to First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, ran for 
Senate against incumbent Republican Senator Connie Mack III. Though President and Mrs. 
Clinton campaigned for Rodham, he did not raise much money and received little help from 
Florida's Democratic establishment; additionally, he only ran one television ad10, an anti-
gun spot (CNN, 1996). Not surprisingly, Senator Mack had a landslide victory of 70% to 
30% (see figure 2.2 for senatorial election results), winning every county in the state, by 
2,454,460 votes. Even in the closest county contest in the state, Gadsden County, Rodham 
lost by -3 percentage points. Meanwhile the race for governor was between the incumbent 
                                                          
10 It is not clear if the ad was run statewide or only in specific media markets, or how often 
the ad was run. 
25 
 
Democrat Lawton Chiles11 and former President George H.W. Bush’s son, Jeb Bush who had 
been appointed Secretary of Commerce under Governor Bob Martinez in 1987-1988. Chiles 
narrowly won a victory by 51% to 49% (see figure 2.3 for all gubernatorial elections), 
winning only 27 of 67 counties (37%) with 63,940 votes. So in 1994, Florida had 
(re)elected a Republican Senator and Democratic Governor.  
Table 2.5 1994 Florida Statewide General Election Results, by media market. 
 
(%) U.S. Senate Governor 
Media Market Dem. Rep.   Dem. Rep. 
Miami 40.1 59.9 58.6 41.4 
West Palm Beach 33.6 66.4 56.9 43.1 
Ft. Myers 22.4 77.6 43.3 56.7 
Tampa 26.6 73.4 49.5 50.5 
Orlando 25.7 74.3 48.0 52.0 
Jacksonville 25.5 74.5 40.1 59.9 
Gainesville 34.3 65.7 59.2 40.8 
Tallahassee 34.7 65.3 60.6 39.4 
Panama City 23.9 76.1 46.2 53.8 
Pensacola 18.8 81.2 38.7 61.3 
 
In the 1998 Senate race, Democrat incumbent Bob Graham faced state senator 
(District 20, Tampa) Charlie Crist. Graham handily won by 62% to 38%, winning 63 of the 
67 counties (94% of the state) by 972,652 votes. And in the 1998 governor’s race, 
Republican Jeb Bush ran again, this time against Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay and 
won with a +10 point margin (55% to 45%), this time securing 61 (21 more than his 
previous run) of the state’s 67 counties (91%), with 418,051 vote margin. Again Florida 
elected opposing parties for statewide offices.  
                                                          
11 Lawton became well-known as “Walkin’ Lawton” for his walk from Key West to 
Pensacola in 1970 to gain attention for his successful bid for U.S. Senate. He served as a U.S. 
Senator until his successful bid for governor in 1990. 
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Table 2.6 1998 Florida Statewide General Election Results, by media market. 
 
(%) U.S. Senate Governor 
Media Market Dem. Rep.   Dem. Rep. 
Miami 77.3 22.7 54.3 45.7 
West Palm Beach 68.1 31.9 53.6 46.4 
Ft. Myers 51.1 48.9 34.8 65.2 
Tampa 57.2 42.8 43.2 56.8 
Orlando 58.6 41.4 41.0 59.0 
Jacksonville 56.6 43.4 36.0 64.0 
Gainesville 70.4 29.6 52.5 47.5 
Tallahassee 75.4 24.6 53.5 46.5 
Panama City 59.7 40.3 34.2 65.8 
Pensacola 47.4 52.6 28.1 71.9 
 
In order to describe Florida’s electoral environment, one cannot discuss 
contemporary Florida politics without addressing the 2000 presidential election, even 
though that election year is not being analyzed here. Texas Republican Governor George W. 
Bush, and brother to Governor Jeb Bush, defeated Democratic Vice President Al Gore in a 
hotly contested battle that ended in front of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore. 
Ultimately, George W. Bush was judged to win by a recount of 537 Florida votes (out of 
5,963,110 votes cast for president), and won 51 of the 67 counties (76%). And while not at 
the same level of intensity or scrutiny, the 2004 Senatorial race between Republican and 
former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Mel Martinez and former Florida 
Education Commissioner and University of South Florida president Betty Castor was also 
very close. Martinez won with 1.1% of the vote (49.4% to 48.3%) winning by 82,663 votes 
and with support of 44 of the 67 counties (66%). These two presidential year statewide 
elections further illustrate the volatility in the Florida electorate. 
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And finally in 2006, Democratic incumbent Senator Bill Nelson, handily beat former 
Republican former Florida Secretary of State and U.S. Congresswoman (District 13, 
Sarasota) Katherine Harris, 60% to 38%, winning 57 of the 67 counties (85%) by 1,064,421 
votes. In the governor’s race, then Republican Florida Attorney General Charlie Crist won 
against Democratic U.S. Congressman (District 11, Tampa) Jim Davis by +7 percentage 
points (52% to 45%), Crist won support in 59 counties (88%), by 341,556 votes. And once 
again in the midterm election, Florida elected both a Republican and a Democrat for 
statewide offices. But in the midterm election of 2010 Florida changed the electoral pattern 
of mixed partisan representation on the same ballot for statewide offices12 and voted for 
Republican leadership in both for senate and for governor.  
Table 2.7 2006 Florida Statewide General Election Results, by media market. 
 
(%) U.S. Senate Governor 
Media Market Dem. Rep.   Dem. Rep. 
Miami 68.4 31.6 58.8 41.2 
West Palm Beach 69.3 30.7 55.2 44.8 
Ft. Myers 52.7 47.3 35.0 65.0 
Tampa 61.0 39.0 44.3 55.7 
Orlando 60.3 39.7 43.2 56.8 
Jacksonville 50.5 49.5 35.9 64.1 
Gainesville 66.6 33.4 52.8 47.2 
Tallahassee 72.5 27.5 54.3 45.7 
Panama City 52.8 47.2 36.0 64.0 
Pensacola 44.6 55.4 32.2 67.8 
 
                                                          


































3.  Hypothesis 
Rural, Democratic counties in Florida are more likely than urban, Democratic 
counties to vote for Democratic candidates in a lower percentage than their Democratic 
registration.  The following races will be examined for Democratic deviation: U.S. Senatorial 
and gubernatorial races during the 1994, 1998 and 2006 general elections.  The 
Democratic deviation occurs due to the following reasons: continued decrease in the 
percentage of registered Democrats, percentage of white voters, population log, population 
density, and media market.   
3.1 Data and measures 
 
This analysis focuses on the absolute deviation of Democratic votes for senate and 
governor from Democratic registration based on the effects of geography, population, and 
ethnicity for each election both offices were on the same ballot. To test the propositions, 
Florida aggregate election results and voter registration statistics by county were gathered 
from the Florida Secretary of State Division of Elections office for the 1994, 1998, and 2006 
general elections.  
The dependent variable is the absolute value of the Democratic percentage of the 
office (senate or governor) vote (%Doffice) minus the Democratic registration percentage 
(%DRV) for each county (for the midterm elections of 1994, 1998, 2006), or the absolute 
Democratic deviation (|Dd|). Or: 




Democratic deviation reflects the absolute distance of the candidate’s total county 
vote percentage from the percentage of registered Democrats in the county. For example, if 
the percent registered Democratic voters was 64 and the Democratic candidate vote 
percentage were 36, the Democratic deviation would be [absolute value of 36 - 64] = 28. 
To evaluate the impact of Deep South politics had through TV media on Florida 
county Democratic dealignment, media markets were used as dummy variables- scored 1 if 
the condition is met and 0 otherwise. These variables allow for the possibility that some 
years are more favorable to the candidates of one party or the other. Four media markets 
are adjacent to Alabama and Georgia and two share a media market with the Deep 
Southern states (Tallahassee, FL-Thomasville, GA and Pensacola, FL, Mobile, AL). Ft. Myers 
media market was excluded from the analysis since it is located in the southern part of 
Florida; it is most rural for that region, and heavily Republican. In all of the midterm 
elections reviewed, both the Democratic Senate and Gubernatorial candidates preformed 
best in terms of vote percentage in South Florida (Miami media market and West Palm 
Beach media market) and in the Panhandle/Northeast (Gainesville media market and 
Tallahassee media market).  
To evaluate the rural effects on Democratic deviation two variables were used. First, 
total voter population was converted into a natural logarithm because population is not 
static and this is a better choice to evaluate exponential growth. The other predictor used 
to determine the effects of rural counties was voter density. The total number of registered 
voters per county was divided by the square miles of the county size. To demonstrate: the 
least dense county, Liberty, had a density of 4.8 voters/square miles in 2006 (4,042 total 
voters divided by the county size of 836.6 square miles), while the densest county, Pinellas, 
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had a density of 2,256.9 voters/square miles in 2006 (total registration of 617,939 voters 
divided by 273.8 square miles). 
The percentage of Democrats (total number of registered Democrats divided by the 
total number of registered voters) in the counties was used to evaluate partisan intensity. 
And the percentage of white voters (total number of registered voters self-identifying as 
white divided by the total number of registered voters) in the counties was used to 
determine the effects white voters had on deviation. 
3.2 Statistical Results of OLS 
The findings presented are for six ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analysis 
of county level absolute Democratic deviation utilizing SPSS 21.0 for Windows. Given that 
the units of analysis are not individuals, it is not necessarily expected to see the same 
relationships adhere that would be seen if analyzing a survey of voters (Robinson 1950). 
1994 Senate 
The overall 1994 Senate model was significant (F(13,53) = 169.68, p<0.001). The 
Miami media market, Gainesville media market, Pensacola media market, percentage 
Democratic registration, and percentage white registration were significant in predicting 
the Democratic deviation (percent 1994 Democratic Senatorial Candidate Rodham received 
minus percent 1994 Democratic registration).  
• Miami media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p=0.002) and 




• Gainesville media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p=0.047 
and being in the Gainesville media market, decreases Democratic deviation by 
4.954 points. 
• Pensacola-Mobile, AL media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation 
(p=0.002) and being in the Pensacola media market, increases Democratic 
deviation by 8.366 points. 
• Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic 
deviation (p<0.001) and each percent increase in Democratic registration, 
increases Democratic deviation by 0.871 points. 
• Percentage white registered voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation 
(p<0.001) and each percent increase in white registration, increases Democratic 
deviation by 0.411 points. 
The entire regression model, including  the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, 
Orlando, Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, 
natural log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, 
and white voters accounted for 97.7% of the variance in Democratic deviation.  
 
1994 Governor 
The overall 1994 Gubernatorial model was significant (F = 21.31, p<0.001). The 
natural log of total registered voters, percentage Democratic registration, and percentage 
white registration were significant in predicting the Democratic deviation (percent 1994 




• Natural log of the total registered voters significantly predicted Democratic 
deviation (p=0.050) and for each unit increase in the natural log of total 
registered voters, Democratic deviation decreased by 2.921 points. 
• Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic 
deviation (p<0.001) and each percent increase in Democratic voter registration, 
causes the Democratic deviation to increase by 0.592 points. 
• Percentage white registered voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation 
(p<0.05) and with each one percent increase in white registration, Democratic 
deviation increased by 0.395 points. 
The entire regression model, including  the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando, 
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural 
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and 
white voters accounted for 83.9% of the variance in Democratic Deviation.  
 
1998 Senate 
The overall 1998 Senate model was not significant (F = 1.473, p=.159). The Miami 
media market demonstrated the only significant predictor in this weak model. The entire 
regression model, including  the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, 
Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural log for total 
registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and white voters 
accounted for 26.5% (8.5% adjusted R squared)of the variance in Democratic deviation 






The overall 1998 Governor model was significant (F = 52.6, p<0.001). The 
Gainesville media market, percentage Democratic registration and percentage white 
registration were significant in predicting the Democratic deviation (percent Democratic 
Gubernatorial Candidate MacKay received minus percent 1998 Democratic registration).  
• Gainesville media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p<0.05) 
and being in the Gainesville media market, decreased the Democratic deviation 
by 7.712 points. 
• Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic 
deviation (p<0.001) and for each percent increase in Democratic voters, the 
Democratic deviation increased by 0.759 points. 
• Percentage white registered voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation 
(p<0.001) and a percent increase in white registration, increased the Democratic 
deviation by 0.329 points. 
The entire regression model, including  the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando, 
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural 
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and 
white voters accounted for 92.8% of the variance in Democratic Deviation.  
 
2006 Senate 
The overall 2006 Senate model was significant (F = 6.41, p<0.001). The Miami media 
market, natural log of the total registered voters, and percentage white registration were 
significant in predicting the Democratic deviation (percent 2006 Democratic Senatorial 
Candidate Nelson received minus percent 2006 Democratic registration).  
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• Miami media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p<0.05) and 
being located in the Miami media market, decreased Democratic deviation by 
10.334 points. 
• Natural log of the total registered voters significantly predicted Democratic 
deviation (p<0.01) and for each unit increase in natural log of total registered 
voters, Democratic deviation increased by 3.486 points. 
• White voters significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p=0.001) and a one 
percent increase in white registered voters, resulted in a 0.293 point Democratic 
deviation increase. 
The entire regression model, including  the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando, 
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural 
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and 
white voters accounted for 61.1% of the variance in Democratic Deviation.  
 
2006 Governor 
The overall 1994 Senate model was significant (F = 169.68, p<0.001). Miami media 
market, Gainesville media market, Pensacola media market, percentage Democratic 
registration, and percentage white registration were significant in predicting the 
Democratic deviation (percent 2006 Democratic Gubernatorial Candidate Davis received 
minus 2006 percent Democratic registration).  
• Miami media market significantly predicted Democratic deviation (p<0.05) and 
being located within the Miami media market, increased the Democratic 
deviation by 9.24 points. 
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• Percentage Democratic registered voters significantly predicted Democratic 
deviation (p<0.001) and with each percent increase in Democratic voters, the 
Democratic deviation increased by 0.565 points. 
• Percentage white registered voter significantly predicted Democratic deviation 
(p=0.001) and a percent increase in white voters, increased Democratic 
deviation by 0.27 points. 
The entire regression model, including  the Miami, West Palm Beach, Tampa, Orlando, 
Jacksonville, Gainesville, Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola media markets, natural 
log for total registered voters, registered voters per square mile, Democratic voters, and 





Table 3.1 Explaining Florida County-level Democratic deviation  
1994 1998 2006 
  Senate Gov Senate Gov Senate Gov 
Intercept -41.624 -20.189 -17.632 -27.550 -51.357 -28.849 
(13.38) (27.769) (27.741) (19.859) (21.336) (18.664) 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale  -8.665* -4.909 15.434 .268 10.334* 9.24* 
(2.729) (5.663)   (6.100) (4.367) (4.658) (4.075) 
West Palm Beach- Ft. 
Pierce  
-3.924 2.149 6.195 .88 6.668 .99 
(2.150) (4.463)  (4.776)  (3.419) (3.720) (3.254) 
Tampa-St. 
Petersburg-Sarasota  
-3.924 2.149 6.195 .88 6.668 .99 
(1.932) (4.01)  (4.245)  (3.039) (3.299) (2.886) 
Orlando-Daytona 
Beach-Melbourne  
-.528 -4.467 4.285 -4.241 5.756 -.212 
(1.892) (3.927)  (4.205)  -3.01 (3.287) (2.875) 
Jacksonville  3.685 6.049 .062 4.868 -1.91 .711 
(1.954) (4.056)  (4.233)  (3.031) (3.198) (2.797) 
Gainesville  -4.954* -8.171 -.279 -7.712* -4.081 -4.311 
(2.441) (5.067)  (5.358)  (3.836) (4.080) (3.569) 
Tallahassee, FL-
Thomasville, GA  
2.307 -3.334 .47 -3.08 1.583 -2.484 
(2.229) (4.626)  (4.856)  (3.476) (3.675) (3.215) 
Panama City  2.804 -3.218 .269 1.221 .082 -1.401 
(2.141) (4.444)  (4.692)  (3.359) (3.535) (3.092) 
Pensacola/Ft. 
Walton,FL-Mobile, AL  
8.366* -.882 -6.067 6.895 -3.327 -2.186 
(2.525) (5.241)  (5.551)  (3.974) (4.325) (3.783) 
Voter Population-LN -1.372 -2.921* .733 -2.249 3.486* -.674 
(0.703) (1.459)  (1.604)  (1.148) (1.224) (1.071) 
Voter Density (Voters 
per square mile) 
.001 .01 .004 .006 .001 .003 
(0.002) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Percent Democrat 
Registered Voters 
.871** .592** .102 .759** .058 .565** 
(0.051) (0.107)  (0.114)  (0.082) -0.100 (0.087) 
Percent White 
Registered Voters 
.411** .395* .189 .329** .293** .27** 
(0.069) (0.144)  (0.116)  (0.083) (0.084) (0.074) 
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 
F-test 169.682 21.313 1.473 52.596 6.410 17.088 
Sig. of F p ≤ .001 p ≤ .001 0.159 p ≤ .001 p ≤ .001 p ≤ .001 
R2 0.977 0.839 0.265 0.928 0.611 0.807 
Adj. R2 0.971 0.800 0.085 0.910 0.516 0.760 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates. Standard Errors in Parentheses. 





Various media markets were significant in four of the models but aside from the 
1994 senate model, no media market adequately explains the theory that counties which 
share media markets with Deep South counties will result in a Southern lag. Pensacola and 
Gainesville were both statistically significant in the 1994 senate model. Not surprisingly, 
deviation increases when voters live in the Pensacola media market and Democrats still 
maintained a net +9.5 point advantage over Republicans. Voters in the Gainesville media 
market had the inverse effect on deviation- reducing it by nearly 5 points (-4.95). And while 
this 1994 senate model points toward the validity of the Southern lag theory based on 
cross TV media influencing Democratic deviation, unfortunately neither of the other media 
markets of Jacksonville, Tallahassee, or Panama City media markets show significance in 
any of the other models. The Gainesville media market is a significant predictor in the 
decline of Democratic deviation in the 1998 governor model, but it is insufficient to make 
extrapolations based on two occurrences. And the South Florida Miami media market was a 
significant predictor of deviation in three of the five relevant models, but is well outside the 
Deep South proximity.   
Neither of the population variables created to test the influence of rural counties on 
deviation indicated consistent significance. In fact, voter density exhibited no significance 
in any model run. Voter population-LN did demonstrate significance in two of the modes: 
the 1994 governor model and the 2006 senatorial race. But again, this is not sufficient to 
support the Southern lag theory. Previous research supports that voters in rural counties 
are realigning to the Republican Party (Black and Black 2002; Gimpel and Karnes 2006; 
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McKee 2010); however, these rural variables were not adequate to determine Democratic 
deviation in Florida. 
The percent of Democratic voters in a county was a significant predictor in four of 
the five relevant models. It demonstrated consistent significance in all three governor 
models and the 1994 senate model. It indicates that superficially high percentages of 
Democratic registration will result in more deviation in the votes for the Democratic 
candidate. This supports part of the Southern lag theory that voters are remaining as 
registered Democrats but in name only. Counties with inflated levels of Democrats do not 
support their party candidates. 
Expectedly when analyzing Southern politics white voters play a prominent role. 
The percent of white voters in a county was the most significant indictor of Democratic 
deviation in five out of the five pertinent models run in this analysis. As discussed earlier, 
the Republican reversal of party control has brought with it the realignment of white 
voters. Republicans have appealed to, and peeled away white conservatives which have 
defused the advantages of white moderates among Democrats. Looking at this analysis 
over time supports the contention that the intensity of the impact of white voters on the 
Democratic vote is gradually declining. Comparing the difference between senate and 
gubernatorial candidates in the same election year is negligible, but the intensity of whites 
on deviation gradually declines from 1994 to 2006. The percent of white voters in a county 
in the 1994 senate model increased Democratic deviation by .411, and in the 2006 senate 
model, each percentage of white voters were responsible for .293 increase in deviation. 
These findings support that whites play an important role in Democratic deviation 
occurrence and that the less diverse a county is the higher the deviation. This supports the 
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Southern lag theory that counties which have similar demographics to the Deep South will 
follow those voting trends. Many counties in the Panhandle/Northeast have a high 
percentage of white voters, but so do counties in the West Coastal region of the state. 
Florida is exhibiting some Southern voting trends, and with it the share of Southern white 
voters with strong long-term ties to the Democrats has shrunk (Lubin, 2004).  
4. Conclusion 
Over the six OLS regressions performed to study the effects of Democratic deviation, 
the theory of rural counties near the Deep South, with low populations and high 
Democratic and high white registration did not fully realize. When all statistically 
significant regressions (5) are compared, the percentage of white voters is a constant 
predictor of deviation. And percentage of Democratic voters is a significant predictor 
variable in four out of five working models. However, the other variables were not 
successful causes in Democratic deviation. 
There are may have been unobserved characteristics which influenced the findings. 
Most importantly, are the candidates and the effects they have on vote percentage was not 
factored into the analysis. All three of the senate races had large vote margins which may 
have unduly inflated the deviation. For example, Hugh Rodham was a low profile candidate 
with ties to the Clintons; Katherine Harris was a polarizing figure who ran a shoddy 
campaign, and Charlie Crist was a virtual unknown against a popular incumbent. All these 
could be additional factors effecting deviation. As well as the incumbency effect candidates 
use as political capital.  
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There are strategic implications that can be taken from this research. Republicans 
can increase their vote margins and exploit the Democratic deviation by targeting counties 
with high percentage of white voters, and identifying conservative white voters who are 
receptive to deviate from their Democratic registration. Republican strategists should 
target counties with low non-white voters and inflated Democratic registration; counties 
with more competitive Democratic registration advantage (less than 15%) will be more 
difficult in persuasion. On the hand, Democratic strategists would do well to focus on the 
counties within the Miami and Gainesville media markets, and to identify moderate white 
voters in high white voter counties who deviate less from the Democratic Party than do 
conservative whites. 
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